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THE POWER TO CONTROL IDENTITY:
LIMITING A CELEBRITY'S RIGHT TO
PUBLICITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent series of television commercials, tennis star
Andre Agassi says that "Image is everything."' Most celebri-
ties would probably agree with this statement, along with the
notion that nothing is more important than the right to con-
trol their image. In California, as in a vast majority of juris-
dictions, the ability to control one's image is accomplished by
protecting against the commercial appropriation of one's
identity.2 Courts and commentators have differed as to
whether this legal protection falls under a theory of "privacy,"
"property," or "publicity," but all agree that the interest exists
and deserves protection.3
As the influence of the media grows increasingly perva-
sive in society, however, the question of how to protect this
interest becomes more troublesome. Traditionally, California
cases involving the right to publicity have stated that an un-
lawful appropriation of the right requires the use of name or
likeness. 4 A recent case, White v. Samsung Elecs. America,
Inc.,5 extends California law in this area to an unknown ex-
1. These commercials, which ran from Spring 1992, until Spring 1994, ad-
vertised Canon cameras. Melanie Wells, ADAGES, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 19,
1994, at 48.
2. See discussion infra parts II.A, II.B, II.C, II.D, II.E, II.F, III.B.1, III.B.2.
3. This commercial interest in identity has been characterized as a privacy
right, a property right, or a publicity right. See, e.g., Republic Pictures Corp. v.
Rogers, 213 F.2d 662, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that reproductions of the
"name, voice, and likeness" of a performer have value due to the performer's
notoriety and public following); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698
F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The right of publicity has developed to protect
the commercial interest of celebrities in their identities."); Williams v. Weisser,
78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969) (allowing a university professor to prevail in a suit for
invasion of privacy when his class notes were published by the defendant with-
out the professor's consent but under the professor's name).
For the purposes of this comment, the commercial interest in one's identity
will be referred to as the right to publicity.
4. See infra note 113.
5. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
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tent by holding that actionable appropriations include a
plaintiff's "identity" as well as those of name or likeness.
This comment explores the court's ruling in White, first
providing a background explaining White in light of prior case
law concerning the right of publicity.' Through an analysis of
the decision,7 the comment determines that a broad right of
publicity, one which extends to anything evoking someone's
identity, could seriously burden creativity." Concluding that
the right of publicity will not be "eviscerated" by a narrower
right,9 the comment proposes the adoption of more tradi-
tional limitations and exceptions10 which will prevent the
White decision from diminishing the rights of copyright hold-
ers and the public at large.'1
II. BACKGROUND
A. Dean Prosser: Early Formulation of the Right to
Publicity
Dean Prosser articulated one of the earliest formulations
of the right to publicity.' 2 In his article, Prosser delineated
four types of invasions that violate the right to privacy: "(1)
Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs; (2) [p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff; (3) [plublicity which places the plain-
tiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) [alppropriation,
for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or like-
ness."' 3 The fourth category, although initially articulated as
a privacy interest, describes what has come to be known as
the right to publicity.' 4 Explaining his formulation of this
6. See discussion infra part II.
7. See discussion infra part III.
8. See discussion infra part III.C.
9. See discussion infra part III.C.
10. See discussion infra part IV.
11. See discussion infra parts III.C, IV.
12. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). The court in
White called Prosser's article "one of the earliest and most enduring articula-
tions of the common law right of publicity cause of action." White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d
1512 (1993).
13. Prosser, supra note 12, at 389.
14. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1398 n.1 ("Under Professor Prosser's
scheme, the right of publicity is the last of the four categories of the right to
privacy."); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834
(6th Cir. 1983) ("Henceforth we will refer to Prosser's last, or fourth, category,
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category, Prosser stated that it must first be determined
whether the defendant appropriated an aspect of the plain-
tiff's identity.15 If the plaintiff is identified, the defendant
still must be determined to have committed the appropriation
for his own advantage. 6
Prosser's formulation of the right of publicity focused on
appropriations of name or likeness,' 7 but he acknowledged in
a footnote that "[it is not impossible that there might be ap-
propriation of the plaintiff's identity, as by impersonation,
without the use of either his name or likeness, and that this
would be an invasion of his right of privacy.""' He immedi-
ately noted, however, that "no such case appears to have
arisen."19
B. Statutory Adoption of the Right to Privacy
According to the Supreme Court of California, "[iltem 4 of
Dean Prosser's classification of invasions of privacy has been
complemented legislatively by Civil Code section 3344 ....
The statute reads in pertinent part: Any person who know-
ingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner,... for the purposes of advertising or
selling, ... without such person's prior consent, ... shall be
liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons in-
jured as a result thereof.21
as the 'right to publicity.' "); Prosser himself referred to the right of publicity
when discussing the interest protected from appropriations of name or likeness
as an aspect of identity, and he recognized that "appropriation is quite a differ-
ent matter from intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light in the
public eye." Prosser, supra note 12, at 406-07.
15. Prosser, supra note 12, at 403. In his discussion of appropriations,
Prosser provided two examples which proved useful to the analysis of later
cases. In one, he stated that publishing a picture of a plaintiff's automobile
with nothing to indicate who owns the car does not constitute an appropriation.
Id. at 404-05. In the other, he claimed there was no liability for basing a fic-
tional character on a plaintiff's character, occupation, or the general outline of
his career. Id. at 405.
16. Id. at 405.
17. Id at 401-05.
18. Prosser, supra note 12, at 401 n.155.
19. Id.
20. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979).
21. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1994).
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C. Eastwood v. Superior Court:22 Interpretation by
California Courts of the Common Law Right of
Publicity
In Eastwood, a weekly newspaper published a picture of
plaintiff and singer Tanya Tucker above the caption "Clint
Eastwood in Love Triangle."28 The newspaper also aired tele-
vision advertisements featuring Eastwood's name and photo-
graph.24 The California Court of Appeal stated that the com-
mon law right of publicity action "may be pleaded by alleging
(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the ap-
propriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness to the defend-
ant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of con-
sent; and (4) resulting injury."25  Since there had been
unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name and photograph, the
court concluded that the newspaper had infringed both his
common law right of publicity and Civil Code section 3344.26
D. Federal Cases and the Right of Publicity
A recent series of circuit court cases has departed from a
rigid name or likeness analysis in construing the California
common law right of publicity. In Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.,27 the defendant used a picture of the
plaintiff's race car in its cigarette advertisements.28 Plaintiff
Motschenbacher, a professional racing car driver, had "indi-
vidualized" his cars to make them easily recognizable as his
own.29 The distinctive features of his car included an oval
white background for his racing number and a narrow white
22. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1984).
23. Id. at 345.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 347 (citation omitted). This description of the common law right
to publicity retains the name and likeness formulation. The court supported
Lugosi's statement regarding the right to publicity and Civil Code section 3344,
stating:
The differences between the common law and statutory actions are: (1)
Section 3344, subdivision (a) requires a knowing use whereas under
case law, mistake and inadvertence are not a defense against commer-
cial appropriation; and (2) Section 3344, subdivision (g) expressly pro-
vides that its remedies are cumulative and in addition to any provided
for by law.
Id. at 346 n.6 (citation omitted).
26. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (1984).
27. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 822.
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pinstripe on the leading edge of the car.3 0 These markings
differed from the markings on all other racing cars. 1
In the advertisement, the defendant altered the picture
by changing the number of Motschenbacher's car and adding
a spoiler which contained the name of the defendant's prod-
uct. 32 Despite the defendant's alterations, the distinctive
characteristics of the plaintiff's car remained.3 3 Further-
more, the plaintiff was driving the car in the picture, but his
facial features were not visible.34
Even though the plaintiff's name was not used and his
likeness was unrecognizable-and therefore neither had
been appropriated-the court held that the plaintiff's Cali-
fornia right of publicity claim should reach the jury.35 The
court stated that "the car under consideration clearly has a
driver and displays several uniquely distinguishing fea-
tures" 36 so that people would "think the car in question was
[the] plaintiff's and ... infer that the person driving the car
was the plaintiff."37
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,38 the Ninth Circuit contin-
ued to expand the common law right of publicity. In Midler,
the defendant aired a commercial in which a "sound-alike"
sang one of Plaintiff Midler's famous songs.3 9 Plaintiff is an
actress and singer who has been described as an "outra-
geously original singer/comedian." 40 The defendant wanted
Midler to sing in the commercial herself, but failed to per-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822 (9th
Cir. 1974). The court described a spoiler as a "wing-like device." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 825-26. As stated earlier, no complete agreement exists as to how
to characterize this right. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Even
though the court refused to decide whether to protect the plaintiff's interest
"under the rubric of 'privacy,' 'property,' or 'publicity,'" it is important to note
that the court protected an interest in identity where a name or likeness had
not been appropriated. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 825-27.
36. Id.
37. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,825-27 (9th
Cir. 1974).
38. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 461-62. The song imitated was Midler's "Do You Want to Dance."
Id.
40. Id. at 461 (citation omitted).
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suade her to do SO. 4 1 Instead, the defendant hired one of the
plaintiff's backup singers, and instructed her to "sound as
much as possible like the Midler record."42 According to
many people, the voice in the commercial "sounded exactly"
like the plaintiff's voice.48
The defendant had not used Midler's name or likeness in
the commercial, but the court nevertheless held that the
plaintiff had stated a claim under the California common law
right of publicity.44 The court reasoned that by using a
sound-alike, the defendants "convey[ed] the impression that
Midler was singing for them" 45 and therefore "for their own
profit in selling their product did appropriate part of her
identity. "46
In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,47 the
Ninth Circuit again allowed recovery without proof that the
defendant appropriated the plaintiff's name or likeness. In
Carson, the defendant used plaintiff Johnny Carson's intro-
ductory slogan to promote its portable toilets.48 Carson had
been introduced with the phrase "Here's Johnny" ever since
he began hosting "The Tonight Show" in 1962, and the phrase
had been used in connection with Carson as far back as
1957.49 Accordingly, the court recognized the twenty-five
year old connection and proclaimed that the phrase "is gen-
erally associated with Carson by a substantial segment of the
television viewing public."5 °
In promoting its portable toilets, the defendant combined
the well-known introduction with another expression, "The
World's Foremost Commodian," in order to make "a good play
41. Id. Apparently, Young & Rubicam, the defendant's advertising agency,
contacted Jerry Edelstein, the plaintiff's manager, and the conversation took
place as follows: "'Hello, I am Craig Hazen from Young and Rubicam. I am
calling you to find out if Bette Midler would be interested in doing... ?' Edel-
stein: 'Is it a commercial?' [Hazen:] 'Yes.' Edelstein: 'We are not interested.'"
Id.
42. Id.
43. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 463.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 463-64.
47. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983).
48. Id. at 832.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 832-33.
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on the phrase."51 The court called the name or likeness for-
mulation of the right of publicity "too narrow,"5 2 and held
that "Carson's identity may be exploited even if his name...
or his picture is not used."
53
E. Policy Considerations Underlying the Right of Publicity
In a recent law review article,54 Michael T. Madow ana-
lyzes celebrities' moral interests in relation to their right of
publicity and concludes that these interests are not as com-
pelling as some might claim.55
1. The Labor Theory: Can a Celebrity Create a
Marketable Identity?
According to Madow, the most frequently advanced con-
tention in support of the right to control one's identity con-
sists of a moral argument based on a labor theory.56 Under
this theory, a famous identity is viewed as a celebrity's prod-
uct, something created through individual labor.57 Madow
argues, however, that celebrities do not create commercially
exploitable identities in the manner traditionally suggested
by the term "create."58 He calls it a "fundamental misconcep-
tion of the processes by which fame is generated and public
images are formed in contemporary society."59 This is true
because fame is a "relational" phenomenon, a status be-
stowed by others.6 0 Madow suggests that the reason one per-
son achieves widespread acclaim, and another does not, may
have less to do with accomplishment or merit than with the
needs and interests of society.61 Despite a celebrity's "labor"
to create and maintain a perfect public image, including the
hiring of a powerful agency to monitor that image and supply
him with advice during his career, a celebrity simply cannot
51. Id. at 834.
52. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983).
53. Id.
54. Michael T. Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993).
55. Id. at 179.
56. Id. at 181.
57. Id. at 182.
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 195.
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create his identity or control its "meaning" exactly and exclu-
sively in the manner he desires.62
Madow's criticism of a carpenter analogy proves quite
helpful in illustrating this point.63 He states that a celebrity
does not make his identity in the same way that a carpenter
makes a chair.64 Although a carpenter responds to public de-
mand as to the type of chair he should make, he makes and
polishes it himself, then places it on the market.65 In the en-
tertainment industry, however, the public participates "di-
rectly and actively in the meaning-making process."
66
2. The Unjust Enrichment Theory: Are Celebrities
Being Exploited?
Madow also identifies a reluctance by courts and com-
mentators to allow unjust enrichment on the part of the de-
fendants in right of publicity actions.67 He argues, however,
that celebrities are actually receiving a windfall
themselves.68
The very idea of unjust enrichment stems from the fact
that the alleged appropriator has made use of the original
"labor" of someone else while not contributing to the creation
of the identity.69 Madow maintains that this "reaping where
one has not sown"70 analysis is deficient in two ways. First, it
62. Id. at 191-92.
63. Id. at 183 (citing Eileen R. Reilly, Note, The Right of Publicity for Polit-
ical Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Am.
Heritage Products, 46 U. Prr. L. REV. 1161, 1168 n.37 (1985)). Madow criti-
cizes Reilly's analogy, described as follows:
A carpenter begins with a virtually worthless piece of wood. Through
a combination of hard work, time, and skill, he converts it into a beau-
tiful chair. He now has a thing of value where none existed before.
Similarly, a celebrity begins as an unknown. He has no publicity
value. Through the investment of many years of hard work, he makes
his name and face marketable. Like the carpenter, he has created a
valuable asset where none existed before.
Madow, supra note 54, at 183.
64. Madow, supra note 54, at 195.
65. Id. at 194.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 196. He points out that defendants accused of appropriation are
described as "poachers," "parasites," "pirates," or "free riders." Id. at 196. In
Midler, the majority noted that "[t]he district court described the defendants'
conduct as that 'of the average thief.'" Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
462 (9th Cir. 1988).
68. Madow, supra note 54, at 196-99.
69. Id. at 200.
70. Id. at 204.
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fails to recognize that celebrities and entertainers "borrow"
liberally from their predecessors. 71 Oftentimes, contempo-
rary products can be said to contain nothing more than a cre-
ative contribution because they lean so heavily on the work
and talents of previous artists. 72 As Madow frames the is-
sue, there is a very real question of how much entertainers
have "'invented' and how much [they have] 'converted.' "73
Second, Madow points out that the unjust enrichment
theory assumes that "appropriators" exercise no creativity of
their own.7 4 Although such blatant appropriations do occur,
they require no effort on the part of the appropriator and are
relatively easy to spot.75 According to Madow, however, it is
more likely that an unauthorized commercial appropriator
has done some "sowing" of his own.76
F. The Main Case: White v. Samsung Elecs. America,
Inc. 77
1. The Facts
Vanna White hosts the television game show Wheel of
Fortune.78 On the show, White stands next to a board with
lighted revolving blocks. 7 9 Each block has a letter on it, and
together the blocks form names or phrases that remain hid-
den from the audience and the game participants.8 0 When
the participants correctly guess the individual letters, White
71. Id. at 197.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 200.
75. For example, imagine a person does not have the consent of any celeb-
rity, but nevertheless wants to make the public think that Brand X toothpaste
can transform them into a "star." If that person lacked creativity, he might
place Vanna White's face or name in a commercial and say, "Look who uses
Brand X toothpaste," but courts would not have a difficult time determining
that he had appropriated her commercially exploitable identity. However, this
type of blind duplication seems a far cry from Samsung's advertisement, dis-
cussed in the following section.
76. Id. at 204-05.
77. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
78. Id. at 1396.
79. Wheel of Fortune is in syndication and airs daily. According to the
White court at the time of the opinion, it is "one of the most popular game shows
in television history. An estimated forty million people watch the program
daily." Id.
80. See Marshall Blonsky, The Game of Games, WASH. POST, April 2, 1989,
at C1.
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turns the block so as to reveal that part of the word.8 ' White
has attained tremendous popularity due to her role on the
show, and she markets her identity to various advertisers.8 2
Samsung Elecs. America, Inc. (Samsung) used a series of
advertisements to promote its electronic products. 8 The ad-
vertisements took items from current culture and placed
them in the twenty-first century with the Samsung product.
All the advertisements had a similar theme: consumers could
count on Samsung products to be around for a long time. 4
The advertisements were intentionally outrageous in their vi-
sions of the future in order to be comical.8 For example, one
advertisement satirized politics by presenting radical talk-
show host Morton Downey Jr. in front of an American flag
with the caption: "Presidential candidate. 2008 A.D."86 An-
other advertisement made fun of society's fitness kick by
showing a raw steak with the caption: "Revealed to be health
food. 2010 A.D.""7
The advertisement which led to a broadening of the pri-
vacy right in California depicted a robot standing next to a
game board.88 The robot wore a wig, jewelry, and gown that
had been chosen to resemble Vanna White's hair and dress.89
The robot's pose next to the board immediately evoked the
image of the game show set of Wheel of Fortune.90 The cap-
tion read: "Longest running game show. 2012 A.D." 9
Although all the celebrities were paid in the other Samsung
commercials, White had not consented to the advertisement
and had not received any compensation for it.92
White sued Samsung in federal district court under: (1)
the California common law right of publicity; (2) California
Civil Code Section 3344(a); and (3) section 43(a) of the Lan-
81. Id.
82. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
(Vol. 35734
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ham Act.9 3 The district court granted summary judgment
against White on each of her claims, and she appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
94
2. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the circuit court held that the use of the robot
was not an appropriation of White's "likeness" within the
meaning of California Civil Code section 3344.95 Conse-
quently, the court therefore affirmed the dismissal of her sec-
tion 3344 claim. 9 6 However, the court also held that, in alleg-
ing facts showing that her "identity" had been appropriated,
White had pleaded a sufficient claim under the common law
right of publicity.97 In reaching this conclusion, the majority
in White ultimately relied on three factors:98 a permissive
reading of the common law cause of action identified in East-
wood v. Superior Court,99 a footnote in Prosser's article on
privacy, 100 and a series of circuit court cases expansively in-
terpreting California law.101
Whereas the circuit court agreed with the district judge
that the robot advertisement had not appropriated White's
"name or likeness" under the second prong of Eastwood,102
the court nonetheless decided that "the common law right of
publicity is not so confined."10 3 According to the circuit court,
the limited facts in Eastwood, which did include such an ap-
propriation, did not allow the California court to determine
the extent of the protections afforded under the right of pub-
93. Id. This comment concerns the extension of California law; accordingly,
the Lanham Act will not be discussed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) of the Lanham
Act for the precise language.
94. White, 971 F.2d at 1396-97.
95. Id. at 1397 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994)).
For the pertinent text of the statute, see supra text accompanying note 21.
96. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
97. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir.
1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
98. Id. at 1397.
99. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
100. Prosser, supra note 12, at 383.
101. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
103. Id.
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licity.104 Therefore, the court concluded that Eastwood did
not stand for the position that a right of publicity action may
be pleaded only in the terms listed above, 10 5 but that it "may
be pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of name or
likeness."106
The court substantiated its conclusions by explaining
that the "name or likeness" formulation originated in an arti-
cle authored by Dean Prosser. 10 7 According to the court,
Prosser articulated this formulation not as an element of a
commercial appropriation of a plaintiff's identity, but as a de-
scription of the types of cases that, until then, had recognized
such an action.108 Furthermore, the court pointed out that
Prosser himself had not excluded the possibility of commer-
cial appropriation without the use of a name or likeness.10 9
Relying upon Prosser's thirty-year-old statement of what
might be possible, the court then turned to circuit court cases
interpreting California law to determine that the right of
publicity is not limited to the appropriation of a name or like-
ness. 110 In the three federal cases discussed earlier,' the
courts held that the common law right of publicity cause of
action applied despite the fact that none of the defendants
had used a plaintiff's name or likeness. 11 2 Accordingly, the
White court stated: "The right of publicity does not require
that appropriations of identity be accomplished through par-
ticular means to be actionable." 3
Concerned with the value of a marketable identity and
the "considerable energy and ingenuity" ' 4 that create such
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 25.
106. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
107. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993). For Prosser's formulation, see supra text
accompanying notes 12-15.
108. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
109. Id. See supra text accompanying note 17 for Prosser's statement.
110. White, 971 F.2d at 1398. It is important to note that, even thirty years
after Prosser's statement, no California case ever allowed such a broad formula-
tion of the cause of action for the appropriation of the right of publicity. See
supra note 91 and accompanying text.
111. The three cases are Midler, Carson, and Motschenbacher. See supra
note 101 and discussion supra part II.D.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 27-53.
113. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
114. Id. at 1399.
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an identity, the court wanted to halt the clever advertising
strategies that would get around the name or likeness formu-
lation. 115 The court stated that "it is not important how the
defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's identity, but
whether he has done so." 1 1 6 According to the court, relying
on specific means of appropriation such as name or likeness
and treating those means as dispositive would eviscerate the
right of publicity.
11 7
3. Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent from the majority's extension of actionable
appropriations to a plaintiff's identity, Judge Alarcon empha-
sized that all California state court cases involving an appro-
priation of the right to publicity required proof that a name or
likeness had been appropriated."" Judge Alarcon criticized
the majority's identity analysis for two reasons: (1) the fed-
eral cases relied on by the majority were distinguishable in
that each appropriation involved an identifying characteristic
singular to the plaintiff;"1 9 and (2) the identity appropriated,
if at all, was that of a Wheel of Fortune hostess, not Vanna
White herself.120 Judge Alarcon, setting up the potential far-
reaching effect of the majority's decision, stated:
The advertisement was intended to depict a robot, playing
the role Vanna White currently plays on the Wheel of For-
tune. I quite agree that anyone seeing the commercial ad-
vertisement would be reminded of Vanna White .... But
the fact that an actor or actress became famous for play-
115. Id. at 1398.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1399.
118. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (Cal. 1993). See also, Lu-
gosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) ("The so-called right of
publicity means in essence that the reaction of the public to name and likeness
... endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially
exploitable opportunities."); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 603 P.2d 454,
457 n.5 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (skepticism about finding a right in a
"personality" because it is "difficult to discern any easily applied definition for
this amorphous term"); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983)
(photograph and name of actor used on cover of magazine); In re Weingand, 41
Cal. Rptr. 778 (1964) (denying an aspiring actor's attempt to change name to
"Peter Lorie" when famous actor Peter Lorre objected).
119. White, 971 F.2d at 1403-04.
120. Id. at 1404-05.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ing a particular role has, until now, never been sufficient
to give the performer a proprietary interest in it.
121
Dissenting from the denial of a petition for rehearing, 122
Judge Kozinski argued that White's publicity rights would
not be "eviscerated" by an advertisement which poked fun at
her. 123 He maintained that intellectual property rights
should have specific limitations, and suggested that the fed-
eral copyright laws were better suited to settle such contro-
versies than an ill-defined common law right of publicity. 124
In reaching this conclusion, he articulated three principal
points: (1) Samsung did not "copy" Vanna White; 125 (2)
rather, Samsung created something new and finny in its ad-
vertisement through parody of a popular cultural icon; 126 and
(3) the court gave White a personal remedy in this situation
which impedes the federal copyright scheme. 127
III. ANALYSIS
A. Factual Distinctions: Why White Extended the Common
Law Right of Publicity Too Far
1. Misreading of Prior Cases
In protecting a plaintiff's identity, the majority initially
sidestepped Eastwood, the case articulating the requirements
for stating a cause of action under the California common law
right of publicity. 128 The California Court of Appeal deline-
ated the manner such an action "may be pleaded,"'1 29 and the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the statement with a permissive
eye, apparently believing that the test was intended to pre-
scribe one of the ways a plaintiff could proceed.' 30 Although
there is nothing inherently wrong with this reading, the sup-
121. Id. at 1405.
122. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2433 (1993).
123. Id. at 1514-15.
124. Id. at 1517.
125. Id. at 1515.
126. Id. at 1517.
127. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512-17 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
128. See supra text accompanying note 25.
129. See supra text accompanying note 25.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
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port for the court's argument remains questionable at best.
To bolster its permissive theory, the court turned to an article
on privacy written thirty years ago by Dean Prosser, which,
among all its other statements of law, contained an after-
thought speculating about what might be possible. 13' Near
the end of this same article, Prosser himself indicated that he
might not favor such an expansion of actionable appropria-
tions: "It is... high time that we realize what we are doing,
and give some consideration to the question of where, if any-
where, we are to call a halt."13 2 In the face of such a caution-
ary ending, a single footnote seems like a slender reed to lean
on in building the court's legal theory.1
33
The ultimate basis for the majority's ruling, however, lay
in the previous decisions of circuit courts. As the court
stated, the three federal cases, Motschenbacher, Midler, and
Carson, teach "that the common law right of publicity ...
does not require that appropriations of identity be accom-
plished through a particular means to be actionable" 134 and
further "teach the impossibility of treating the right of public-
ity as guarding only against a laundry list of specific means of
appropriating identity."135 Certainly, the federal cases cited
extended actionable appropriations beyond the name or like-
ness formulation; however, this does not necessarily mean
that the right to publicity cannot be specifically limited. As
Judge Alarcon pointed out in his dissent, the federal cases
themselves suggest one such limitation.1
36
In each of the federal cases, "identifying characteristics
unique to the plaintiffs were used in a context in which they
were the only information as to the identity of the individ-
ual."137 For example, in Motschenbacher, the advertisement
featured a driver's race car whose unique and distinctive
markings-the only information as to the plaintiff's iden-
131. Prosser, supra note 12, at 401 n.155.
132. Id. at 423.
133. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
134. Id. at 1398.
135. Id. at 1399.
136. Id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1404.
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tity-made it clear that the plaintiff was the person in the
car. 
13 8
In Midler, the only information provided with respect to
the identity of the singer was the voice itself, which was in-
tended to sound just like the plaintiff.1 3 9 Claiming that a
voice is as distinctive as a face, the court stated that "we are
all aware that a friend is at once known by a few words on the
phone." 140 For singers who rely on their voices to make them-
selves identifiable, the human voice is the unique attribute.
For example, consider Mariah Carey. 4 ' Although she may
have talents that have yet to be discovered by the public, her
singing voice alone makes her instantly "recognizable" and
separates her in the public's mind from other entertainers.
In Carson, a manufacturer used the phrase "Here's
Johnny" to promote portable toilets. 142  This phrase, well-
known as Carson's unique opening to his show, was again the
only information provided as to the identity of the
individual. 143
Each of these situations, through the use of a single char-
acteristic unique to the plaintiff, made the public think the
plaintiff had actually participated in the advertisement or
138. See supra text accompanying notes 27-37. It is also important to note
that these facts are consistent with Prosser's formulation of the right to public-
ity. Prosser states that an appropriation fails to exist where the defendant pub-
lishes a picture of the plaintiff's automobile with nothing to indicate who owns
the car. See supra note 14. In Motschenbacher, however, there were indications
as to the owner of the car, so Prosser's limitation does not apply. Therefore, if
Motschenbacher is consistent with Prosser's description of commercial appropri-
ations, the majority cannot use this case, as it does, to support its extension of
the right of publicity along the lines of Prosser's footnote: "Since Prosser's early
formulation, the case law has borne out his insight that the right of publicity is
not limited to the appropriation of name or likeness." White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512
(1993).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
141. Mariah Carey is a pop singer whose vocal abilities brought her consider-
able fame in the early Nineties. See Tom Moon, Carey Striving for Creative
Control; Top Pop Singer is Learning Ropes of Music Making, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Dec. 12, 1993, at N4.
142. See supra text accompanying note 48.
143. The facts in Carson prove somewhat troublesome for the analysis at-
tempted in this section, however, this problem will be addressed more fully in
the last section of this comment. For now, think of the phrase describing Car-
son-which, like the game board in White, is arguably part of the background of
the show-as a more direct link to the plaintiff than the game board was to
White.
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had in some way given a stamp of approval to the product.
This statement does not apply to the facts in White. Her per-
sonal attributes, such as her face or voice, were not used or
represented in any way. The other characteristics of the ad-
vertisement "hostess"-the gown, the hair, and the jewelry-
are not unique to White or any other woman. After all, White
has no monopoly on simply "looking good."144 If the robot, in
fact, caused the public to think of a beautiful woman, White
certainly might have been one of the women who came to
mind. Considering only the robot in the advertisement, how-
ever, no one could say that a robot by itself, even a sharp-
looking, dressed-up robot in a pretty gown and expensive jew-
elry, made him or her think solely of Vanna White. Therein
lies the fundamental difference between White and the fed-
eral cases: the advertisements in the federal cases did not
evoke images of a race-car driver or a singer, but identified
that particular driver or singer. Yet, as Judge Alarcon
stated, "No reasonable juror could find that the robot was a
likeness of Vanna White ... 145
2. Misapplication of the Legal Standard
Even though the robot in White could not be confused
with Vanna, the advertisement did evoke her image. If the
robot itself could not evoke her image by simply looking like
her, the question remains as to how the advertisement re-
minded the public of White. The attribute that identified the
robot as White, the only thing "unique" or identifiable about
the advertisement, was the background of the show on which
she performs. This background, although certainly not com-
mon to others, serves as an attribute of Wheel of Fortune it-
self, not Vanna White. The identifying characteristic reveals
itself as that of a game show, in which White merely performs
144. In fact, she probably does not even have a right in the particular way
she looks good. A number of cases have repeatedly rejected style as a basis for
recovery, so White could not successfully claim that certain mannerisms or the
way she carries herself give her a personal style that had been infringed upon.
Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1992) ("style imitation alone
[is] insufficient for tort liability"). See also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988); Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir. 1970); Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
145. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
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as the current hostess. White should not have a personal
right of recovery for a representation of the show.
Assuming that a robot in a wig and gown could be any-
body, but that a robot in a wig and gown on the Wheel of
Fortune set is Vanna White, and assuming that she has a
right of publicity for such a portrayal, a rule is created which
makes the game show an intrinsic part of her commercially
exploitable identity. White, and presumably others in the
entertainment industry, would therefore have an exclusive
right not only in their appearance or their personality, but
also in what they do for a living.
It seems improbable that the Ninth Circuit meant to hold
that actors and actresses can recover for the roles they
play146 since the majority relies on Prosser. After all, Prosser
himself stated that no liability exists for appropriation when
the defendant bases a fictional character on the plaintiff's
character, occupation, or the general outline of his or her ca-
reer. 147 However, this appears to be an underlying principle
of the analysis. The majority must have believed that White
had made a material contribution to the success of the show,
and therefore deserved to recover for a portrayal of her role
on the show.
B. Deficiencies in the Arguments Underlying the Right of
Publicity
Before suggesting alternatives to the White decision,1 48 it
is important to acknowledge some of the principles that give
146. As Judge Kozinski points out, this would be a tremendous problem be-
cause other than a name, likeness, or voice, celebrities are most often identified
with the characters they become famous for playing. White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993). See also
Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989). In Nurmi, the 1950's
television movie hostess "Vampira" sued the 1980's television movie hostess
"Elvira," alleging that the defendants' affiliated firms appropriated the plain-
tiff's identity by basing "Elvira" on a previously developed character, even
though they did not copy that character exactly. Plaintiff cited Midler for the
proposition that "the imitation of a distinctive character is actionable under the
right of publicity," but the court distinguished Midler by saying that the plain-
tiff had only recovered for "the defendants' fraudulent attempt to deceive the
public into believing that the plaintiffs were actually present." Id. at 1777.
147. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Even the majority in White
would likely admit that a robot in 2012 A.D. must be considered a fictional
character.
148. See discussion infra part IV.
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rise to the right to publicity. By ascertaining the underlying
rationale of the court in extending actionable appropriations
to a plaintiff's identity, the errors that would lead to such a
broad right can be more easily identified.
Why did the Ninth Circuit feel that Vanna White de-
served protection? Presumably, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that in working to achieve fame and to increase marketabil-
ity, she had a moral interest in her identity that deserved
protection. Recall Michael T. Madow's analysis of this moral
argument.1
49
In applying Madow's analysis to the case under consider-
ation, the first discussion should explore the question of who
"owns" Vanna White. This inquiry is not simply about who is
entitled to the economic values that attach to her identity.150
Instead, the critical issue involves Vanna White's meaning to
our culture, and whether she has the right to control that
meaning through her publicity rights.
151
One hears how celebrities have "built" an image or "culti-
vated" their God-given talents, so we suppose that they de-
serve all the fruits of their fame. 15 2 As one judge stated: "A
celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of
practice and competition in a public personality which even-
tually may reach marketable status. That identity, embodied
in his name, likeness, statistics, and other personal charac-
teristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property."
153
The majority in White echoed this labor theory, referring to
the "considerable energy and ingenuity" that creates a mar-
ketable identity.15 4
However, as Madow indicates, the public plays a sub-
stantial role in creating the meaning that attaches to a par-
ticular identity.155 A good example of the public's participa-
tion in the "meaning-making" process is the tumultuous
career of Michael Jackson. 156 Unless performing, Jackson
149. See discussion supra part II.E.
150. See discussion supra part II.E.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
152. Madow, supra note 54, at 134.
153. Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970)
(emphasis added).
154. See supra text accompanying note 114.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
156. Michael Jackson, the so-called "King of Pop" is arguably the most fa-
mous singer/entertainer in the world. See Michael Wilbon, We Saw Stars, and
They Were Us, WASH. PoST, Jan. 27, 1993, at C1.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
has always very carefully and deliberately shied away from
the press and the public. Nevertheless, his image over the
years has gone from eccentric pop superstar, to freakish re-
cluse, to alleged criminal following allegations involving sex-
ual abuse of children.157 This phenomenon exemplifies the
enormous role played in the meaning-making process by the
public and the media. A celebrity's public image, therefore, is
"the product of a complex social process in which the 'labor' of
the celebrity is but one ingredient, and not always the main
one." 158 Accordingly, celebrities should not be able to lay a
moral claim to the exclusive ownership or control of the eco-
nomic values that attach to that image.
159
Nonetheless, Madow explains that courts and commenta-
tors have been unwilling to permit defendant "appropriators"
to be unjustly enriched. 160 As Madow points out, however,
celebrities such as Vanna White actually receive a windfall
themselves.1 6 1 For instance, the role White plays on televi-
sion as a game show hostess was actually created by a
number of others, including writers, directors, and producers.
Even so, White, and White alone, receives the benefits of the
commercial marketability of her identity due to this collabo-
ration.1 62 At the least, it seems unfair that White would com-
plain when another party has not appropriated her identity
directly, but has merely drawn from her hostess role through
portrayal of the game show itself.
Remembering Madow's statement that it is not clear how
much entertainers "invent" and how much they "convert,"
163
it is apparent that celebrities like Vanna White seek to have
it both ways when they complain about appropriation. 1 64 For
example, White presumably feels that she has not infringed
157. If the allegations against Jackson prove untrue, it is very convincing
evidence that no matter how hard a celebrity tries, he cannot control his public
image. See Jessica Crosby, While Jackson Tours, The Lawyers War Suit
Against Pop Star Begins to Heat Up, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at B1.
158. Madow, supra note 54, at 195.
159. Id. at 184.
160. See supra text accompanying note 67.
161. See supra text accompanying note 68.
162. Of course, it seems entirely appropriate that she would receive such
benefits; this comment does not insist that White can claim no benefits of her
fame, but is attempting, first, to point out the theoretical limitations of the ar-
guments favoring the right to publicity, and second, to apply these limitations
in order to arrive at a general rule.
163. See supra text accompanying note 73.
164. Madow, supra note 54, at 198-99.
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on another's right, correctly believing that her own personal-
ity and style have added a certain intangible value to the role
of a game show hostess. Moreover, she feels that these addi-
tions have made her identity on the show qualitatively differ-
ent than the countless hostesses who have performed on
game shows before her. Yet she fails to see the same distinc-
tion when Samsung draws from "culture's image bank."16 5
In the present case, if Samsung had merely copied Wheel
of Fortune and Vanna White, the advertisement would not
have been funny. Instead, Samsung, drawing from the image
bank, took the underlying idea of the game show-a game
board with an elegant-looking hostess who turns the letters-
and altered it, thereby creating something new and adding to
the bank of existing ideas. As a small piece of this new crea-
tion, White received an unfair windfall through the right of
publicity.
C. Feasibility of a Laundry List166
The notion of one adding to culture's image bank helps to
address the majority's concern that a "rule which says the
right of publicity can be infringed only through the use of
nine different methods of appropriating identity merely chal-
lenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the
tenth." 67 Contrary to the majority's belief that a laundry list
is entirely unworkable, 168 such a list actually pushes the
clever advertising agent further from an appropriation. For
example, in forcing Samsung to circumvent what would be an
appropriation-basically, reproducing the "labor" of another,
whether it be an idea or an identity-the law forces Samsung
to create something instead of copying it. The further Sam-
165. Id. at 199. Madow uses the example of the "openly and unabashedly
derivative" Madonna to illustrate this point:
Having drawn freely and shamelessly from our culture's image bank,
she is trying to halt the free circulation of signs and meanings at just
the point that suits her. She is seeking to enforce against others a
moral norm that her own self-consciously appropriationist practice
openly repudiates. The law need not be a party to such contradiction.
Id.
166. The term "laundry list" was used by the majority in White to refer to a
list of specific kinds of appropriations. See supra text accompanying note 135.
167. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
168. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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sung is forced outside the laundry list, the further it gets
qualitatively from its original "bank" source.
Dissenting Judge Kozinski supports this view, stating
that a laundry list is not only feasible, but necessary in intel-
lectual property law. 169 He reveals that other than the spe-
cific intellectual property rights conveyed though statutory
measures such as California Civil Code section 3344,170 his-
tory has allowed people to draw on the work of their predeces-
sors, "referring to it, building on it, poking fun at it; we call
this creativity, not piracy."17' According to Kozinski, in seek-
ing to do away with specific limitations, the majority has im-
plied that the right of publicity contains "penumbras" that
cannot be infringed. 172 Under constitutional law, only funda-
mental rights, those "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty"173 or "fundamental to an American scheme of jus-
tice,"174 deserve such lofty status. Considering Madow's
discussion, 175 it seems unlikely that "ordered liberty" would
cease to exist without recognizing the right to publicity as
fundamental.
On a more practical level, the failure to confine publicity
rights to specific kinds of appropriations will cause future cre-
ators-including entertainers and advertisers-to grapple
with vague claims of identity infringement. Clearly, under
the present state of the law, a robot placed in the wrong con-
text will create liability, but the governing limitations remain
unclear. Is the majority willing to extend celebrity ownership
of the "meaning-making" process so far that a popular image
or identity can never be evoked without consent? If a comical
scene in which a robot turns a replica of the Wheel of Fortune
game board gives White a personal right to recover, then will
the show be guilty of evoking her identity even if they replace
169. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
170. See supra text accompanying note 21.
171. White, 989 F.2d at 1515.
172. See id. at 1514.
173. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
174. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
175. See discussion supra part II.E.
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her with an elderly brunette, 176 or "a monkey in a wig and
gown?"1
77
In articulating a "protective" rule that is purportedly pro-
artist, the majority has restricted entry into the "image bank"
in a way that stifles creativity and ultimately makes the pub-
lic at large culturally poorer. This "impoverishing of the pub-
lic domain," as Judge Kozinski designates it, will occur since
"[future Vanna Whites might not get the chance to create
their personae, because their employers may fear some celeb-
rity will claim the persona is too similar to her own."1 78 As
for the public itself, just imagine the enormous social vacuum
that would be created if Bob Barker 179 was the host of every
game show, or we had never been introduced to the likes of
Pat Sajak 18 0 or Alex Trebec.181
D. The Copyright Problem
Foreseeing this problem, Judge Kozinski maintained
that the analysis in White should have been based on the fed-
eral copyright laws.'8 2 He stated that Samsung had not cop-
ied White, but had parodied her in her role as hostess on
Wheel of Fortune.18 3 Wheel of Fortune is a copyrighted televi-
176. This may seem silly because as an employee of the show, the producers
have the right to replace White when her contract expires. However, the court
in White did not clearly define any limits to the right of publicity, and although
the question is asked partly in jest, it does exemplify the uncertainty prevalent
in the entertainment and advertising industries. To answer the question, it
appears that under the current state of affairs the best advice might be: "When
in doubt, pay her off."
177. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
178. Id. at 1516.
179. A popular game show host best known for his work on The Price is
Right. The Price is Right is in syndication and airs daily. See Blonsky, supra
note 80.
180. The host of Wheel of Fortune. Wheel of Fortune is in syndication and
airs daily. Id.
181. Another popular game show veteran known for hosting Jeopardy!.
Jeopardy! is in syndication and airs daily. Id.
182. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
183. The majority quickly dismissed this parody defense, saying that "De-
fendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial parodies.
The difference between a 'parody' and a knock-off' is the difference between fun
and profit." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
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sion show, and federal copyright law governs parodies of
copyrighted works.18
In copyright law, two issues affect the analysis of the
present case. First, the world at large has the right to make
"fair use" parodies-i.e., takeoffs that do not borrow too much
of the original.18 r Second, the copyright owner has the exclu-
sive right to create or license the creation of derivative works,
including parodies that do not qualify for "fair use" rights. 186
An example of these principles at work would be the recent
film Loaded Weapon J.1 17 In making a parody of Lethal
Weapon"'8 and other action movies, the producers of Loaded
probably acquired a license for a derivative work, since, in all
likelihood, they were borrowing more than they had a right to
under the "fair use" doctrine.
Maybe Samsung went too far to qualify for "fair use," but
whether it should have acquired derivative license is not the
issue here. According to Kozinski, the problem is that "the
right to make parodies belongs either to the public at large or
to the copyright holder, not to someone who happens to ap-
pear in the copyrighted work.
1 8 9
Under the majority's decision to extend the common law
right of publicity, however, it appears that celebrities can
now block this federal scheme. 190 Eventually, the two rights
are bound to conflict. For example, imagine that a license is
given for a derivative work of Wheel of Fortune to a poster or
T-shirt company. The celebrities of the show, in an effort to
control the meaning of their identity, may not want their
184. White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for rehearing).
185. Id. (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986)). Remember
the discussion of celebrities borrowing from "culture's image bank." See supra
note 157 and accompanying text.
186. White, 989 F.2d at 1517.
187. LOADED WEAPON I (Universal 1993). The picture was a spoof of action
movies. See Tom Shales & Rita Kempley, New on Video, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,
1993, at C7.
188. LETHAL WEAPON (Universal 1986). This is one of the above-mentioned
action movies. See AIjean Harmetz, Movie Box Offices Break New Records, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1987, at 6B.
189. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 n.24 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993). See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d
425, 433-34 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring).
190. White, 989 F.2d at 1518. Actually, Kozinski stated that the majority's
decision "decimates" federal copyright law. Id.
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images emblazoned on cheap T-shirts around the country.
Essentially, the copyright owner will be robbed of the value of
his or her federally-protected copyright, because in order to
avoid liability under the common law, he or she will need the
approval of the show's performers. This same type of conflict
will arise when someone makes a "fair use" parody, making
the parody exception to copyright "useless [since] the parodist
is held hostage by every actor whose 'identity' he might need
to 'appropriate.' "191
Kozinski acknowledges limitations of the copyright laws
to subject matters "fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion. "192 However, he not only maintains that the laws
should have applied under the facts in White, but more im-
portantly, implies that the federal copyright scheme should
completely preempt a common law right of publicity. 193 Re-
sponding to the majority's concern about the commercial na-
ture of Samsung's advertisement, he states the "line between
commercial and noncommercial has not merely blurred; it
has disappeared."19 4 Because all speech in the entertainment
industry is "for profit," including traditional parodies such as
Saturday Night Live or Spy Magazine,195 Kozinski claims it
is too significant to be discarded as not within the federal
scheme. 196
IV. PROPOSAL
This comment disagrees with the decision in White. It
also rejects dissenting Judge Kozinki's implicit argument
that there should be no common law right of publicity.
Rather, it proposes that limitations must be adopted which
191. Id.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1988).
193. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for rehearing). Kozinski cites Mosk's concurrence in Lugosi, wherein Mosk sug-
gests that "the copyright statute... be adapted to an artistic or literary crea-
tion where there is no actual recorded American copyright." Lugosi, 603 P.2d at
433 (Mosk, J., concurring).
194. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
195. Id. Saturday Night Live is a weekly television program featuring com-
edy skits. See David Bianculi, A Faded 'Saturday Night Live', PHIL. INQUHIER,
Nov. 11, 1985, at C3. Spy Magazine is a satirical magazine. See Tom Shales,
Spy 'Hit list': It Was a Very Bad Year, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1992, at B1.
196. White, 989 F.2d at 1520 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for rehearing).
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will define the outer boundaries of the law more clearly and
provide a greater amount of certainty for entertainers, adver-
tisers, copyright holders and the public at large.
In the absence of one of the types of appropriation speci-
fied under California Civil Code section 3344, this comment
proposes the adoption of two limitations on the common law
right of publicity. First, the identifying characteristic must
belong to the plaintiff.197 Second, the public must be under
the impression that the plaintiff has personally endorsed the
product.
The first proposed limitation-that the characteristic
must "belong" to the plaintiff-is not necessarily confined to
physical ownership, but it is also not as broad as a simple
association. For the purposes of this limitation, "belong"
means that the characteristic must be so closely tied to the
plaintiff as to identify him or her unmistakably. Thus, Mot-
schenbacher would be allowed recovery because the car,
while not physically his characteristic and therefore a "back-
ground" trait, did belong to him and was the defining charac-
teristic of his identity. 9 '
The facts of Carson prove more troubling for this test.199
It might be argued that the phrase "Here's Johnny" is not a
unique characteristic of the plaintiff because it was a part of
Carson's television show. The phrase, however, is an identi-
fying characteristic and does directly refer to Carson him-
self.200 In contrast, the identifying characteristic in White
had no direct connection to the plaintiff. Although there was
some indirect connection, since the plaintiff was an employee
of the show and both the plaintiff and the background were
ingredients in the show, the identifying characteristic did not
represent an attribute of the plaintiff herself.
197. By definition, this proposed limitation would include a laundry list of
specific actionable appropriations, as in California Civil Code section 3344. See
supra text accompanying note 21. This is true because uses such as those of
name, likeness, and voice, clearly are unique to, and belong to, a plaintiff. How-
ever, the proposed limitation would also move beyond a laundry list, easing
some of the concerns of the White majority. See supra text accompanying notes
114-16, 134-35.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 27-37, 138.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
200. It might also be argued that, as a use of the plaintiff's name, the dis-
tinctive feature belonged to the plaintiff. However, this argument probably
stretches the proposed limitation too far. Of course, it is possible that Carson
cannot be reconciled with the proposed limitation.
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If the identifying characteristic does not belong to the
plaintiff, copyright law would be the preferred method of ob-
taining recovery. This proposal rejects an exclusive reliance
on the federal copyright scheme, recognizing that celebrities
have commercial interests in their identities that warrant
protection. However, these rights should not be so broad and
amorphous, such as they are when there is no limitation on
the nature of an actionable appropriation, that they infringe
on copyright law. Copyright law contains clearly defined
boundaries-the right of publicity should have them as well.
Through a limitation based on ownership of the identifying
characteristic, conflicts between the two theories should not
develop as frequently, and hopefully, the rights of copyright
holders will not be diminished.
Second, the public must think the plaintiff has given a
stamp of approval to the product. This test is obviously sub-
jective, but so is the particular meaning attributed to a celeb-
rity's identity. This proposed limitation would separate ap-
propriations for the defendant's advantage from incidental
uses of a plaintiff's identity that might nevertheless benefit
the defendant.
For example, as in the case of Motschenbacher, if a close-
up of a driver's race car is shown with an advertising slogan
under it, a representation of endorsement has been made.
However, if the driver's car is merely seen from a distance as
one of many driving around a track while a voice says "Drink
Brand X Beer," there has not been such an endorsement.
Such a commercial could merely mean that people who drink
beer like car racing. Unlike White, in each of the federal
cases the defendants represented to the public that the plain-
tiff had supported the product, whether by singing, lending a
name, or providing a picture. In White, the public is not
under the impression that White endorses Samsung products
merely because the advertisement depicts the show which
employs her. The public does not mistake the robot for
White, despite the efforts to parody her with fancy clothes,
wig and jewelry.
The underlying rationale of this proposed limitation re-
lies upon the previous discussion of moral rights.2 °1 Moral
arguments favoring the ability to control one's identity, for
201. See discussion supra part II.E.
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instance, do not support a general right against mockery.
This is true because mockery and disagreement, on a certain
level, lead to richness and diversity of thought in our culture.
However, these moral rights do seem sufficiently strong to re-
strict representations regarding endorsements of products
without consent. Most people would agree that there is an
enormous difference between being generally portrayed as a
buffoon, and being specifically represented as supporting, en-
dorsing, or approving of a certain product.
Another underlying principle of the proposed approval
limitation is the idea of consumer protection. As Madow
points out, we cannot assume that consumers buy a certain
toothpaste simply because a celebrity with a beautiful smile
claims to use that toothpaste.20 2 However, such advertise-
ments do provide the consumer with "some information"
about the product-even if just the notion that the celebrity
has taken the time to endorse the product.20 3
The California Supreme Court is in the best position to
implement the foregoing proposed limitations on the common
law right of publicity. The Ninth Circuit has signed off on
White, meaning that it stands unchallenged as the law. As a
matter of state tort law, review of the issue by the United
States Supreme Court appears unlikely. California can solve
the confusion created by the federal courts in one of two ways:
(1) comprehensive state legislation on the issue; or (2) a defin-
itive statement of California state law by the California
Supreme Court. Since the former seems improbable as well,
entertainers, copyright holders and the public at large must
look to the California Supreme Court to define the limits of
this state's common law right of publicity and halt the evis-
ceration of competing rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In departing from the traditional name or likeness formula-
tion and extending California's common law right of publicity
to anything evoking someone's identity, the Ninth Circuit in
White has created a law which could seriously burden creativ-
ity. Considering some of the errors in the underlying ration-
ale of the right of publicity, this stifling effect on creativity is
202. Madow, supra note 54, at 230.
203. Id.
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particularly undesirable. It is important to remember that,
unlike the majority's argument in White, a narrower defini-
tion of the right of publicity will not eviscerate the right.2 °4
On the contrary, the proposed limitations will provide cer-
tainty to all interested parties, thereby stimulating creativity
while continuing to protect the interests of entertainers,
copyright holders and the public at large.
Todd J. Rahimi
204. See discussion supra part III.C.
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